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A Review of FDA Imports Refusals - US Seafood Trade 2000-2010 
 
Abstract 
The United States is the third largest consumer of seafood products in the world. The percentage 
of imported seafood consumed in the U.S. has steadily increased from 66% in 1999 to over 84% 
in 2009 (NOAA, 2010). Food safety, especially of imported foods and products from developing 
countries, has raised increasing concerns among American consumers and policy makers. 
Accordingly, the Food and Drug Administration‟s (FDA) (Ababouch et al. 2000) border 
inspection system is considered critical for ensuring the safety of domestic seafood consumers. 
However, the potential non-tariff barrier to trade posed by FDA regulations, especially for many 
developing country exporters have been frequently cited ain the literature.  
This paper investigates trends and patterns in U.S. import detentions and refusals of seafood 
products between 2000 and 2010. Data from U.S. FDA import refusal report is used to uncover 
patterns of detainments and import refusals across major exporting countries, World Bank 
income classification and time. The analysis in this paper suggests that the FDA‟s approach to 
food safety regulation for seafood at U.S. ports of entry does follow random selection based 
inspections. Instead, a system of Import Alerts results in targeted inspections and mandatory 
“flagging” of repeat code violation. We find evidence of increasing levels of seafood shipment 
detentions without physical examinations targeted at predominantly lower-middle income 
seafood exporting countries which make up the majority of the U.S. seafood supply.     3 
 
Introduction 
Seafood products are one of the most highly traded commodities. The United States, the 
world‟s largest producer and importer, sources seafood products from over 130 countries. U.S 
seafood imports reached $14.2 billion in 2008, up from $8.1 billion only a decade earlier. Much 
of this growth has been satisfied by imports from an increasing number of developing country 
producers that, in 2008, accounted for 85% of all U.S. domestic consumption.  
Rapid growth in imports from developing economies, many of whom have not developed 
extensive food safety systems, has raised concerns about the safety of imported foods. The 
potentially rapid spread of food safety hazards in international agri-food trade has motivated the 
introduction of stricter regulatory standards and enforcement measures. All seafood imported 
into the U.S must meet mandatory Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) safety 
standards. Implemented in 1997 HACCP standards are in accordance with the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Imported seafood products have been found to consistently rank highest for violations of U.S. 
import regulations for reasons of adulteration (Buzby and Roberts 2010; Allen et al. 2008).  
The objective of this paper is to investigate the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) data from import refusal reports of seafood imports into the United States from 2000-
2010.  
Descriptive analysis is used to highlight trends and patterns in seafood import refusals 
across major U.S. trade partners ordered by WTO income classification and categories of FDA 
code. The analysis matches FDA product descriptions to international trade data to quantify the 
economic impact of the FDA‟s enforcement of U.S. food safety border regulations on its major 4 
 
trade partners located in developed and developing countries. Previous studies that have used 
FDA import refusal data ((Buzby and Roberts 2010; Allen et al. 2008) have focused on either 
refused shipments or total detentions. The following analysis contributes to the literature by 
updating previous research with actual data until 2010. We also explicitly distinguish between 
the overall patterns of border detentions shipments of seafood products that were ultimately 
refused by the FDA. This step allows for a more precise measurement of the impact FDA import 
refusals had on trade and therefore whether U.S. regulatory policy did act as a barrier to trade for 
specific countries.  
The trade literature largely agrees upon the fact that food safety related standards can 
amount to “standards as barriers” to trade and frequently violate fairness in trade by 
disadvantaging particularly poorer developing countries. While essential to assuring domestic 
food safety, the risk of new trade measures is their potential as a non-tariff barrier to trade, 
especially for exporters in developing countries who may not have the appropriate infrastructure 
in place or resources to comply. In contrast to the above view, Jaffee and Henson (2008) argued 
that the competitive pressure and opportunity provided by emerging food safety standards, the 
“standards as catalysts” view, may force export oriented countries to quickly adapt to new trade 
rules to increase their competitive advantages. 
The increasing dependence of the U.S. economy on food imports from developing 
countries have culminated in public pressure that forced the FDA to apply stricter inspection and 
enforcement measures to assure the safety of imported seafood products (GAO 2010). Recently, 
the FDA has been pressured to additionally strengthen its oversight of food imports by 
improving enforcement methods and increasing available resources (GAO 2010). The mandatory 5 
 
nature of many food safety policies deployed by the U.S. FDA may pose non-tariff trade barriers 
to foreign competitors resulting in changes in bilateral seafood trade flows.  
 
Literature Overview  
The existing trade literature suggests that food safety standards imposed by developed 
countries can have harmful effects on trade (Swann, 2010), and particularly for commodity 
exports from developing countries (Henson and Loader, 2001; World Bank, 2005; Henson and 
Jaffee, 2008). For the case of standards as barriers to seafood trade the papers by Anders and 
Caswell (2009) and Nguyen and Wilson (2009) are cases in point. Although most studies support 
a standards-as-barriers hypothesis, they present different theories as to how food safety standards 
affect trade, and the extent of trade impediment.  
For example, Henson and Jaffee (20080 state that food-safety or quality standards may in 
fact benefits producers in developing countries by forcing technological progress and learning  
through the implementation of stricter standards thereby creating a competitive advantage that 
may lead to gains in international trade.  
For the specific case of seafood exports to the U.S, Anders and Caswell (2009) found that 
the mandatory implementation of HACCP in the U.S. seafood sector resulted in trade losses for 
the majority of developing country exporters. However, the analysis revealed that larger players 
in the international seafood market where able to gain trade and expand their U.S. market share 
regardless of development status, mostly at the expense of smaller seafood exporters. A similar 
study by Nguyen and Wilson (2009) confirmed that HACCP standards had a continuous negative 
effect on seafood trade from all developing countries. But the magnitudes of trade effects 6 
 
differed across seafood products. The above share the common goal of quantifying the impact of 
food standards on bilateral trade flows, specifically for developing countries. An alternative 
approach to measuring the impact of food standards in trade is to look directly observe and 
analysis the extent to which regulatory measures are enforced at border, leading to the refusal of 
products deemed for import into a country. Observing trends in border refusals of commodities 
such as seafood can pinpoint countries of origin and/or individual products that caused large 
number of violations of existing standards and therefore faced a significant barrier. This 
approach also often provides insights into the reasons behind the rejection of products. By that 
border refusal information can provide more detailed, policy relevant information on the impact 
of specific policy measures and their potential impact as barriers to trade.  
To date several studies have used import refusal report information to study the impact of 
border food safety policies, encompassing all food categories. The existing evidence suggests 
that seafood accounts for a relatively large share of all import refusals at U.S. ports of entry1 
(Buzby et al., 2008; Buzby and Regmi, 2010; Gale and Buzby, 2009). Papers by Allshouse et al., 
2003; Buzby et al., 2008; FAO, 2005; Food and Water Watch, 2007), focusing exclusively on 
U.S. import refusals of seafood, concluded that the majority of ultimately refused seafood 
shipments originated from developing countries. The above studies found that filth, salmonella 
and listeria were among the most frequent reasons for the violation of U.S. FDA food safety 
rules for seafood imports. Shrimp was found to be the product associated with the most 
violations. A report published by the Food and Water Watch (2007) also highlighted the rise of 
veterinary drug residues in imported seafood products associated with the growth in aquaculture 
and predominantly products originating from China.  
                                                           
1 Between 1998 and 2004, seafood products accounted for 20.1% of all food products refused by the FDA, 
which is the second largest number of refusals after vegetables at 20.6% (Buzby, 2008). 7 
 
FDA Import Refusal Reports 
Mandatory HACCP compliance was implemented in the U.S. seafood market in 1998 as a 
regulatory food safety measure to mitigate and control seafood-borne health hazards to 
consumers. The FDA‟s statutory authority and responsibility is to protect the health and safety of 
U.S. consumers by inspecting shipments into the U.S. market at the port of entry that appear to 
violate one or more of the code regulations.  
The border detention of shipments and subsequent inspection by FDA staff, however, 
does not imply that detained shipments are necessarily in violation of FDA code regulations. 
According to Section 801(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act, detention of 
imports occurs, if they “appear to be in violation of one of the laws enforced by the FDA” and 
“the appearance of a violation may arise by the examination of physical samples, a field 
examination, review of entry documents, or based upon the history of prior violations by the 
same shipper”. However, complete sensory and/or laboratory testing is only conducted on about 
2% of all imported seafood shipments. Moreover, shipments are not chosen randomly, but 
according to a set of FDA risk based criteria (Buzby et al. 2010). For the majority of shipments 
the FDA relies on self-reported HACCP compliance documentation provided by the (seafood) 
exporter to the U.S. (Food and Water Watch, 2007).  
One such measure is the issuing of „import alerts‟. Also known as “flagging”, FDA 
Import Alerts instruct FDA staff to automatically detain without physical examination all imports 
of the affected product(s) from a listed manufacturer and/or country of origin that fall under a 
notice until the exporter demonstrates to the FDA that the violation has been corrected (Buzby, 
2010). It is the responsibility of the importer to present the required evidence (usually in the form 8 
 
of test results and/or shipment documentation) that allows the FDA to confirm complies with 
relevant FDA code regulations.  
 
Data 
Two datasets are applied in this paper. The first set of data includes information on annual 
bilateral trade flows of seafood exports from major countries of origin to the U.S broken down 
by product type over the period 2000 to 2010. The data was obtained from the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture's Foreign Agriculture Service (AFS) BICO trade database (USDA 2011). 
Data on U.S. FDA Import Refusal Reports (IRR) for the period of 2000-2010 were obtained 
directly from the FDA through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) data request. FDA records 
include information on the detention and/or refusal of individual shipments of seafood destined 
for the U.S. market. The data further provides information on the reasons for detention (refusal) 
following FDA IRR classifications together with the size (quantity in kg) and value of the 
affected product. Individual IRR records include the shipment‟s country of origin, product 
description, FDA product code, charge or reason for detention, the value ($) and size (kg) of the 
affected shipment, and final activity that is whether or not the shipment was ultimately released 
or refused with or without physical examination.  
Product description information was categorized into the main seafood classes using the 
FDA‟s code builder, and one of seven most common seafood species: Shrimp, Tuna, Salmon, 
Lobster, Crab, Mahi Mahi, Catfish, and Tilapia. The classification of FDA code violations 
revealed two main reasons for detention: adulteration and misbranding. Detentions for reasons of 
adulteration refer to physically product deficiencies such as: filth, bacterial contaminations from 
Salmonella or Listeria, traces of unapproved veterinary drug residues, or other unsafe additives). 9 
 
Detentions for reasons of misbranding refer to incomplete or missing product labeling and/or 
shipment documentation. Individual shipments can be charged with multiple reasons for 
detention, leading to several observations in the FDA‟s IRR data.  
 
Trends and Patterns in U.S. FDA Seafood Refusals  
Between 2000 and 2010 lower-middle income countries have grown to become the largest 
exporters (by value) of seafood to the U.S. In 2000, lower-middle income countries accounted 
for 43% of all seafood exports to the U.S and 56% in 2010. The market share of all other income 
classes has been declining; most notably for upper-middle income economies. In 2000 Canada 
was the top exporter, followed by Thailand, China, Mexico and Chile. Since then, the annual 
value of seafood shipments from China have grown over 300%, making China the leading 
supplier of seafood to the U.S. market. Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and Ecuador are all among 
the largest exporters while Canada, Mexico and Chile have fallen behind and lost market share in 
the U.S. In 2010, among the top 25 seafood exporters 9 were high-income countries, 7 upper-
middle income countries, and 8 lower-middle income countries. Bangladesh was the only low-
income seafood exporter country among the top 50 seafood exporters to the U.S. The above 
trends in U.S. market shares are also reflected in FDA border detentions of seafood shipments 




































Following their rise in exports to the U.S. low-middle income countries‟ share of FDA 
refusals has grown from 43% in 2000 to 64% in 2009. During the same period refusals of 
seafood originating from high-income and middle-income countries have declined substantially, 
from 35% to 17%. Low-income countries which account for less than1% of U.S. seafood imports 
(by value) were responsible for 5.5% all refusals in 2009.  
In line with the concentration of U.S. seafood imports from a decreasing number of 
countries of origin, a smaller number of exporting countries is responsible for a greater 
proportion of total product refusals. In 2000 the top three seafood exporters accounted for 26% 
of refused shipments, their share had grown to 43% in 2009.  
In line with the development of aquacultural production systems around the world and 
the growth in the demand for popular tropical seafood species the proportion of refusals between 
species and production system has also changed. Refusals of seafood harvested from aquaculture 
systems have steadily grown from 1% in 2000 to roughly 11% in 2009. Shrimp products both 
from aquaculture and wild caught made up 21% of all refusals. However the relation between 11 
 
refusals of wild caught shrimp to aquaculture shrimp of all refused shrimp shipments has leveled 
out as aquacultural production has become more and more important. Overall, the total number 
of refused shrimp shipments to the U.S. market has increased over time, shrimp products only 
account for 14% of all seafood border refusals. In 2009, tuna was the product with a share of 
17% of all refusals and peak of 22% in 2008; a significant increase from just over 7% a decade 
earlier (Appendix, Table A). 
 
Table 1: FDA code violations by exporter income class (% refused of detained shipments), 
2000-2010 
Income 
class    2000  2001  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
High 
All refusals (#)  138  70  608  547  380  306  264  405  290  183 
Filthy/Insanitary  46.4  32.9  30.6  21.2  34.2  22.2  27.7  26.7  37.9  34.4 
Needs FCE  17.4  12.9  18.8  19.2  11.1  12.4  17.1  18.8  17.6  22.4 
No process  27.5  18.6  21.9  25.2  20.3  15  19.3  21.7  21.4  29 
Nutrition label.  15.2  20  7.4  4.4  12.9  6.2  10.2  17.5  12.8  13.7 
Salmonella  3.6  12.9  6.9  7  9  12.1  16.7  12.8  13.8  7.1 
Upper-
Middle  
All refusals (#)  80  28  349  306  243  155  210  174  244  180 
Filthy/Insanitary  32.5  60.7  44.7  44.8  46.5  34.8  45.2  56.9  56.1  68.3 
No process  3.8  10.7  11.5  7.5  10.3  8.4  3.3  58  8.2  3.3 
Salmonella  35.0  7.1  17.5  33.7  27.6  23.9  13.8  28.2  20.9  15.00 
Lower-
Middle 
All refusals (#)  170  89  1104  1129  1077  747  1165  1036  1075  830 
Filthy/Insanitary  69.4  66.3  47.6  58.7  46  38.7  47.  49.2  55.1  46.4 
Needs FCE  4.1  2.3  6.7  3.6  2.2  5.4  3.3  4  2.8  5.4 
No process  4.1  2.3  7.6  4.69  4.2  6.3  5  6.2  4.4  7.6 
Salmonella  36.5  43.8  37.1  38.2  39.7  27.7  21.7  22.8  24.5  32.2 
Vet drugs  0  0  7.3  5.4  6.1  13.9  16  12.7  10.2  7.6 
Low 
All refusals (#)  7  3  72  210  120  51  54  91  67  69 
Filthy/Insanitary  57.1  66.7  73.6  77.1  72.5  45.1  74.1  63.7  642  59.4 
Salmonella  0  33.3  19.4  76.2  41.7  41.2  13  69.2  50.8  56.5 
 
Table 2 depicts the patterns of the most frequent FDA code violations across country 
income classes as the percentage share of detained shipments that ultimately were refused entry 
into the U.S. market. In general, high-income seafood exporters account for a larger proportion 
of refusals for misbranding code charges. Common violations were lacking required 12 
 
documentation such as “Food Canning Establishment Number (FCE) “needs FCE”, “no 
process”, and false or incomplete mandatory “nutrition labeling”. Interestingly, although code 
violations for “no process” and “needs FCE” are directly related to incomplete shipment 
documentation the FDA classifies these charges as adulteration. This may ultimately lead to an 
overestimation of the significance and impact of adulteration as a food safety threat associated 
with imported seafood products. 
Over the entire course of the data, however, code violations due to adulteration were the 
most common reason for the detention and/or refusal of seafood at a U.S. port of entry. Filth, 
insanitary conditions of shipments were found in over 50% of all shipments detained by the 
FDA, Shipments contaminated with Salmonella accounted for 23% of all FDA detentions. For 
all exporters but those from high-income countries FDA code violations for adulteration account 
for close to 90% of all detentions. Especially in the case of lower-middle income seafood 
exporters, which account for the largest market share in the U.S., FDA charges almost 
exclusively are based on Salmonella and generally insanitary product/shipment conditions.  
 
Detention vs. Refusal  
Growing public pressure on the FDA to strengthen its oversight and enforcement of U.S. food 
safety regulations has also included criticisms regarding its reliance on exporter supplied 
documentation and due process as a substitute for larger numbers of physical examinations of 
import shipments (Food and Water Watch, 2007). 
2 
                                                           
2 Improvements have been made, most notably the opening of FDA offices in important countries of origin in an 
effort to improve point of origin inspections (GAO, 2010) following the example of other major seafood importers 
such as the E.U. and Japan (FAO, 2005).  
 13 
 
Among the FDA‟s strategies to cope with the thousands of seafood shipments arriving in 
U.S ports every day is the Import Alert system, or “flagging”. Based on repeated FDA code 
violations over time manufacturers, shippers or countries can be “flagged” and trigger the release 
of an Import Alert by the FDA notifying border staff that each affected shipment and products 
has to be detained without the need for physical examination (Buzby, 2010). The procedure of 
Import Alerts, aimed at disseminating import information on violation trends and issues FDA 
inspectors, and trigger the intensified surveillance of particular products and/or country of origin 
may in fact lead to several unintended consequences. Since it is the responsibility of the 
exporters to provide additional documentation to prove a shipment‟s compliance with FDA code 
regulations Import Alerts, once published, may not be removed or lead to an accumulation of 
Import Alert over time potentially causing significant entry barriers to the U.S. market.  
 
Table 2: Seafood import detention, refusal and market share for selected exporting 
countries (%), 2000-2010 
  Detained  Refused  Market share 
China  34.86  11.87  15.56 
Thailand  5.05  4.53  15.41 
Indonesia  10.66  12.83  7.03 
Vietnam  17.95  16.71  5.23 
South Korea  3.90  3.34  0.74 
All other  1.11  1.42  7.92 
(Canada)  1.80  1.65  15.48 
Total  73.52  50.70  51.89 
* Aggregate totals are for the top 18 exporters to the U.S. market. 
 
Table 2 highlight the divergence that can be, at least, partially be attributed to the FDA‟s 
Import Alerts system. Across the top seafood exporting countries, all lower-middle income 
countries, and Canada percentage shares of detentions and refusal of shipments relative to a 14 
 
countries market share in the U.S. diverge. Most upper-middle and high income countries (i.e. 
Canada) tend to account for smaller shares of detainments and refusals relative to their market 
share. In contrast, China, the top seafood supplier to the U.S. shows detainment rate three time 
the actual rate of shipment refusals; noticeable evidence that the FDA has taken actions to 
address reoccurring food safety issues associated with fishery and seafood imports from China 
(Food and Water Watch, 2007; Gale and Buzby, 2009). Table 3 seems to indicate a definite bias 
in food safety related border inspections towards seafood products originating from China. In 
fact, both Vietnam and Indonesia had higher refusals rates compared to China in 2009. However, 
both countries poses less than a third of China‟s market share in the U.S.  
A pattern in the targeting of FDA border detentions is also evident from Table 3. Here a 
comparison of patterns and trends in routine detentions, shipment selected for inspection based 
on a suspected violation of code rules, and detentions without physical examination, based on 
previous violations and existing Import Alerts. Given this definition one would expect shipments 
detained without physical examination to have refusal rates lower than for those shipments 
detained on the basis of historical records. Table 3 reveals the opposite. The number of 
detentions without physical examination for the group of lower-middle income countries exceeds 
those of any income class over the period of observation. In 2009, lower-middle income 
countries accounted for 83% of all shipments detained without physical examination. 
Surprisingly, the percentage of shipments from this country group ultimately refused has been 
lower than the for other income groups (as supported by Table 2). The percentage of shipments 
from lower-middle income countries detained without physical examination that were refused 
was 5.3% in 2009, compared to 15% from high-income countries, 17.7% from upper-middle 
income countries and 19.3% from low-income countries.  15 
 
Table 3: Detentions and detentions without examination of U.S. seafood imports by 
exporter income class, 2000-2010 
Income class 
2000  2001  2007  2008  2009  2010 
#  %  #  %  #  %  #  %  #  %  #  %  
Detained  1003  25.42  1364  10.34  1857  51.05  1933  52.3  2051  54  1388  53.2 
High  436  25.5  516  10.7  455  33.2  584  46.8  443  38.8  249  50.6 
Upper-middle  128  26.6  166  14.5  255  52.2  205  53.2  335  51  181  55.8 
Lower-middle  416  24.8  669  8.8  1079  57.3  1094  54.2  1225  59.2  912  52.7 
Low  23  30.4  13  23.1  68  67.7  50  70  48  81.3  46  67.4 
Detained w/o Exam  2569  5.5  2764  1.8  6442  11.6  7368  9.5  8007  7.1  5948  8.8 
High  559  4.8  650  2.3  720  15.7  581  22.7  791  14.9  622  9.2 
Upper-middle  483  9.5  357  1.1  755  10.2  427  15.2  411  17.8  303  26.1 
Lower-middle  1495  4.5  1700  1.8  4821  11.4  6151  7.20  6660  5.3  4863  7.2 
Low  32  0  57  0  146  5.5  209  26.8  145  19.3  160  23.8 
 
While the total number of refused shipments from lower-middle income countries still 
exceeds refused shipments from the other income classes this developing country group of 
seafood exporters receives a remarkable level of scrutiny. Overall, detentions of seafood 
products entering the U.S. grew by 104% between 2000 and 2009, while detentions without 
examination grew by 212%. For lower-middle income exporters detentions of shipments grew by 
194% to 2009, while detentions without examination grew by 341%.  
This finding, in conjunction with the above results seems to indicate a bias in the FDA's 
strategy towards food-safety border inspection to the detriment of lower-middle income 
countries. In summary, seafood exporters to the U.S. located in lower-middle income countries 
face significant barriers to trade from U.S. FDA food safety import regulations.  
 
Conclusions:  
  The analysis in this paper suggests that the FDA‟s approach to food safety regulation for 
seafood at U.S. ports of entry does follow random selection based inspections. Instead, a 
system of Import Alerts results in targeted inspections and mandatory “flagging” of repeat 16 
 
code violation. We find evidence of increasing levels of seafood shipment detentions 
without physical examinations targeted at predominantly lower-middle income seafood 
exporting countries which make up the majority of the U.S. seafood supply.  
The most significant finding is that the “bias in the FDA's strategy towards food-safety 
border inspection seems to especially burden lower-middle income countries and as such create a 
significant barriers to trade from U.S. FDA food safety import regulations for lower-middle 
income country seafood exporters to the U.S.  
  Despite the fact that lower income countries make up the largest proportion of refused 
seafood imports, both, import market shares, and shares of seafood refusals are concentrated 
on a smaller number of suppliers.  
  Despite the FDA‟s Import Alerts and targeted approach, lower-middle income seafood 
suppliers have been to perform and expand their market share in the U.S. at the expense of 
mostly high-income country producers (e.g. Norway).  
  China, the most important supplier of seafood products to the U.S.  is not the most frequent 
offender of U.S. food safety code and outperforms other middle-low income suppliers such 
as Vietnam and Indonesia.  
  Detentions and refusals of seafood shipments for reasons of adulteration increase with 
decreasing development status and are highest for lower-middle income countries. Insanitary 
conditions (filth) and Salmonella are among the most common reasons for refusal all 
seafood producers but hose from high-income countries.  
  Finally, the results found in this paper largely support published results regarding the 
significant and negative impact of food safety standards (standards-as-barriers hypothesis) 
on exports from poorer developing countries. However, our findings also seem to support 17 
 
Henson and Jaffee (2008) that stricter standards will lead to differential performance 
outcomes within exporting countries, as individual producers react differently to new 
requirements. Given the (aggregate) national level of the FDA Import Refusal data records 
we cannot resolve the contradiction between high refusal rates and successful bilateral trade 
with the U.S. for countries within the lower-middle income group. If at all, the standards-as-
catalyst hypothesis may apply at the firm level and not at the national level 
   18 
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Appendix 
Table A: Refusals shares by seafood product category and species, 2000-2010  
2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009





PRODUCTS 1.52 5.79 10.83 15.05 16.70 9.37 11.93 11.90 10.68 11.57
SHRIMP 1.01 5.26 9.99 14.46 14.89 7.78 9.98 9.09 7.76 6.89
Other 0.51 0.53 0.84 0.59 1.81 1.59 1.95 2.81 2.92 4.68
CRUSTACEAN 27.85 21.58 19.78 23.86 22.86 18.19 18.02 15.94 19.93 16.72
CRAB 3.54 4.21 5.67 9.26 5.66 3.97 6.14 7.97 7.88 5.86
LOBSTER 3.29 1.05 2.11 4.11 5.16 3.65 1.00 1.52 3.40 3.09
SHRIMP 20.25 15.79 11.49 10.13 11.37 9.93 10.69 5.86 6.03 7.21
Other 0.76 0.53 0.52 0.36 0.66 0.64 0.18 0.59 2.63 0.55
ENGINEERED 
SEAFOOD 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.59 0.77 0.56 0.47 0.06 0.18 0.55
FISH 41.52 58.42 51.24 44.71 45.93 52.90 56.17 56.39 54.77 61.57
MAHI MAHI 2.28 3.16 2.48 5.98 3.30 2.78 4.19 5.22 4.89 5.23
SWORDFISH 3.04 4.21 5.58 2.97 2.64 1.99 3.84 1.52 2.27 2.69
TUNA 7.09 7.89 10.36 6.98 9.18 8.82 13.76 22.68 16.83 24.56
Other 29.11 43.16 32.82 28.79 30.82 39.32 34.38 26.96 30.79 29.08
MIXED FISHERY 
PRODUCTS 1.52 1.05 1.88 1.00 1.70 1.11 0.95 1.35 0.84 0.63
OTHER AQUATIC 
SPECIES 9.87 3.68 5.06 6.07 4.95 7.31 5.73 6.62 7.16 2.93
OTHER FISHERY 
PRODUCT N.E.C 9.11 3.68 5.30 5.38 3.85 4.92 4.78 5.22 4.89 4.60
SHELLFISH 8.61 5.79 5.63 3.33 3.24 5.64 1.95 2.52 1.55 1.43 